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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
v. 
JOSE LUIS VICENTE, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 20020201-SC 
REPLY BRIEF 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
THIS COURT REVIEWS FOR CORRECTNESS THE COURT OF 
APPEALS' DECISION TO REACH THE MERITS OF THIS APPEAL 
The court of appeals reached the merits of defendant's appeal despite defendant's 
status as a fugitive, apparently believing that a decision to dismiss or adjudicate was 
discretionary. See State v. Vicente, 2002 UT App 43 (memorandum decision). Defendant 
now claims that this Court should review the court of appeals' decision to adjudicate a 
fugitive defendant's appeal for an abuse of discretion. Br. Respondent at 2. This Court 
should review for an abuse of discretion, however, only if the court of appeals correctly 
determined that the decision to reach the merits was discretionary. That is a question of 
law, reviewable for correctness on certiorari review. See State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 
1 6, 994 P.2d 1243; State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, \ 17, 933 P.3d 837. If the court of 
appeals improperly determined that the decision is discretionary, this Court must reverse. 
If the court of appeals properly determined that the decision is discretionary, then—and 
only then—will this Court will review the discretionary decision for an abuse of 
discretion 
Defendant's cited cases are not to the contrary. As explained in the following 
Argument, dismissal of a fugitive defendant's appeal is mandatory, not discretionary, 
although dismissal is without prejudice and subject to reinstatement when the fugitive 
returns and is again subject to the control of the judicial system. See State v. Tuttle, 713 
P.2d 703, 704-705 (Utah 1985). This Court's precedent uses mandatory, not 
discretionary, language in its cases on this issue. Seef e.g., Hardy v. Morris, 636 P.2d 
473,474 (Utah 1981) (stating that fugitive "cannot call upon the resources of the Court 
for determination of his claims" and "'escaped prisoner should not be allowed to reap the 
benefit of a decision in his favor when the state could not enforce a decision in its 
favor'") (citation omitted). 
Further, defendant is not aided by the two Utah court of appeals cases he cites. 
One, State v. Vicente, 2002 UT App 43 (memorandum decision), does suggest that the 
decision to reach the merits of a fugitive defendant's sentence is a discretionary 
decision—"we decline to dismiss this appeal." Id. at % 3. Vicente, however, is the case 
here under review. In reviewing the case, this Court surely is not bound by the very 
decision it is reviewing. In any case, Vicente is a decision from the court of appeals and 
is not binding on this Court. See Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 70 n.l (Utah 1998). 
2 
The other case, State v. Moya, 815 P 2d 1312 (I Jtah App. 1991), is similarly 
iinpcrsUiisp r I ilk I \tiente \hn ii i i ilrusmn tmifti lln11 iiiiil nl .ippf.ih Mil tliei'Hoif IH 
not binding on this Court. Geisdorf, 972 P.2d at 70 n. 1. In addition, in reaching its 
decision in Moya, the court of appeals majority rejected "the statefs] suggestion] at oral 
argument that defendant [was then] a fugitive justice," concluding that ''nothing 
in the record... substantiate)^] this claim" and observing that "the state has not sought 
dismissal of the appeal on this basis." 815 P.2d at 1313 n.l. The court of appeals 
therefore did not determine whether it could address a fugitive defendant's appeal, and 
the . provide* Dport for defendant's claim that review should be for abus* 
discretion. 
Defendant's citations to foreign cases to support his standard of review argument 
ai € • like * ise inappositi " s i t|iiliiiic (il  III lln Inline nig 'ugtnm ml in iiinsilu'linii 
dismissal of a fugitive defendant's appeal is with prejudice, the procedural and policy 
considerations favoring discretionary, rather than automatic, dismissal are different than 
the> are in a jurisdiction like Utah, where dismissal of a fugitive defendant's appeal is 
without prejudice and subject to reinstatement upon the defendant's return from 
fugitivity. 
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Reply to Defendant's Point I 
UNDER UTAH PRECEDENT, A DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
APPELLATE REVIEW OF HIS APPEAL WHILE HE REMAINS A 
FUGITIVE BUT IS ORDINARILY ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT 
OF HIS APPEAL UPON HIS RETURN 
A. This Court's precedent mandates dismissal of a fugitive defendant's appeal. 
This Court has clearly held that a defendant is not entitled to appellate review of 
his appeal while he remains a fugitive. In Hardy v. Morris, 636 P.2d 473 (Utah 1981), 
this Court held that a fugitive defendant "cannot call upon this Court to decide his appeal. 
Id. at 474 (emphasis added). By escaping, the fugitive defendant "has placed himself 
outside the control of the judicial system." Id. Therefore, "a ruling adverse to him could 
not be enforced." Id. Consequently, he "cannot call upon this Court to decide his 
appeal." Id. (emphasis added). This Court also quoted and declared its agreement with 
the following reasoning: 'The dismissal of such an appeal is justified on the theory that 
the escaped prisoner should not be allowed to reap the benefit of a decision in its favor 
when the state could not enforce a decision in its favor." Id. (citing Golden v. State, 243 
SE.2d 303, 304 (Ga. App 1978) (emphasis added). 
This Court revisited its decision in Hardy when it decided State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 
703 (Utah 1985). Again, this Court employed mandatory language when it reiterated the 
"settled rule" laid out in Hardy: "[0]ne who escapes places himself beyond the reach of 
the judicial system and any ruling cannot be enforced against him, therefore, he should 
4 
not be allowed to pursue an appeal while out of custody." Turtle, 713 P.2d at 704 
(emphasis added). 
This language indicates that appellate courts must dismiss the appeals of fugitive 
defendants. It does not suggest that appellate courts should exercise their discretion in 
dismissing these appeals or that appellate courts should engage in the kind of weighing 
•miiif! hiilfiiu: nig of factors that attends discretionary decision-making.1 
B. In a jurisdiction like Utah, where dismissal of a fugitive defendant's appeal is 
without prejudice and subject to reinstatement upon the defendant's return 
from fugitivity, sound policy favors automatic dismissal. 
I he i: I lie r eqi nil ing oi pei mittingan appellate \ 
defendant's appeal, sometimes called the "fugitive dismissal rule," the "fugitive 
disentitlement doctrine," or the "escape rule," varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
In most jurisdictions, the dismissal rule is a judicially-created doctrine See 
Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234,242 (1993) (noting that "our cases 
consistently and unequivocally approve dismissal as an appropriate sanction when a 
prisoner is a fugitive during 'the ongoing appellate process'"); State v. Schneider, 888 
* «*• '• 995) f shaping contours of judicial rule while observ i n g 
1
 Defendant states that Hardy v. Morris "discussfes] the circumstances under which 
an appellate court declines review." Br. Respondent at 2 (emphasis in original). Hardy's 
only use of the term "decline" is a reference to a United States Supreme Court decision 
"declining to adjudicate the merits of [a fugitive's] appeal." 636 P.2d at 474 (citing Molinaro 
v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970)). As explained under Reply to Defendant's Point 
LB., the dismissal of an appeal in the federal system is a dismissal with prejudice and 
therefore raises different procedural and policy considerations than a dismissal without 
prejudice, the dismissal mandated by Hardy and its progeny. 
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that no Idaho statute or promulgated rule requires dismissal of an appeal as a result of 
appellant's escape from custody); State v. White, 81 S.W.3d 561, 565 (Mo. App. 2002) 
(referring to "judicially created doctrine"). 
In other jurisdictions, however, the dismissal rule is a creation of statute or rule. 
See Or. R. App. P. 8.05(3) (If a defendant... on appeal of an adverse decision, escapes or 
absconds from custody or supervision, the respondent on appeal may move for dismissal 
of the appeal. If the appellant has not surrendered at the time the motion is decided by the 
court, the court shall allow the motion and dismiss the appeal "); Tex. R. App. P. 42.4 
("The appellate court must dismiss an appeal on the State's motion, supported by 
affidavit, showing that the appellant has escaped from custody pending the appeal 
and. . . has not, within ten days after escaping, voluntarily returned to lawful custody 
within the state/'). 
In Oretega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234 (1993), the United States 
Supreme Court enumerated some of the reasons for applying the rule to dismiss the 
appeals of fugitive defendants: 
• while a defendant is fugitive, there is "no assurance that any judgment" an 
appellate court might issue "would prove enforceable," 
• fugitivity "disentitles a defendant to call upon the resources" of the 
appellate court, 
• dismissal of a fugitive defendant's appeal "discourages escape and 
encourages voluntary surrenders," and 
• dismissal of a fugitive defendant's appeal "advances an interest in efficient, 
dignified appellate practice." 
Id. at 239-242. 
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Defendant argues that the fugitive dismissal rule should be discretionary in Utah, 
that is, that Utah appellate courts should exercise their discretion to determine whether or 
not to reach the merits of appeals by fugitive defendants. See Br. Respondent at 2, 12-13. 
In support, he correctly observes that the fugitive dismissal rule is discretionary in the 
federal system and in some state courts, including Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, and 
Oklahoma.2 See id. 
In citing the discretionary exercise of the rule in some jurisdictions, however, 
defendant does not address a critical distinction between the operation of the rule in most 
other jurisdictions and the operation of the rule in Utah. In most jurisdictions, when a 
fugitive's appeal is dismissed, the dismissal is not—as in Utah—without prejudice. 
Rather, as imposed by most jurisdictions, the fugitive dismissal rule operates to 
extinguish a defendant's right to appeal and not merely to postpone defendant's exercise 
of the right. See State v. Bell, 608 N.W.2d 232, 235 (N.D. 2000); State v. Collins, 42 
S.W.3d 736, 738-739 (Mo. App. 2001); In re CG., 630 A.2d 1266,1268 (Pa. Super. 
1993). Thus, the dismissal of a fugitive's appeal is not—as in Utah—subject to 
reinstatement when the defendant is apprehended. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 608 N.W.2d 
232, 235 (N.D. 2000) ("We hold that [the defendant] is precluded from maintaining his 
appeal because he forfeited and abandoned his appeal by escaping."); State v. Collins, 42 
S.W.3d 736, 738-739 (Mo. App. 2001) ("The escape rule operates to deny the right of 
2
 Defendant does not note, however, that application of the rule is mandatory in other 
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Or. R. App. P. 8.05(3); Tex. R. App. P. 42.4. 
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appeal to a defendant who escapes justice.") (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted); In re C.G., 630 A.2d 1266, 1268 (Pa. Super. 1993) ("Where a defendant is a 
fugitive at any time after post-trial proceedings commence he forfeits his right to 
appellate review. This forfeiture is irrevocable and cannot be undone despite capture or 
voluntary return to custody.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But see 
People v. Taylor, 617 N.E.2d 188, 190 (111. App. 1993) ("[A]n appellate court has 
discretionary power to refuse to hear a fugitive's appeal unless and until the fugitive 
returns "). Therefore, precisely because invocation of the rule works a sweeping 
disentitlement, most jurisdictions make the decision to dismiss discretionary with the 
appellate courts.3 
3Some of the cases cited by defendant in his argument for discretionary treatment 
involve defendants who absconded, but who were no longer at large at the time of their 
appeals. See Br. Respondent at 12-13 (citing Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 
234 (1993) and State v. Nath, 52 P.3d 857 (Idaho 2002)). Whether to hear the appeal of a 
defendant who was once a fugitive is not the same question as whether to hear the appeal of 
a defendant who is and remains a fugitive during the pendency of his appeal. See Ortega-
Rodriquez, 507 U.S. at 249 ("[W]e conclude that while dismissal of an appeal pending while 
the defendant is a fugitive may serve substantial interests, the same interests do not support 
a rule of dismissal for all appeals filed by former fugitives."); Nath, 52 P.3d at 862-863 
(contrasting policy considerations where defendant is absent during trial court proceedings 
with those considerations where defendant is absent during appellate proceedings). 
In jurisdictions where dismissal is equivalent to forfeiture, courts exercise their 
discretion more liberally to hear the appeals of defendants who, though formerly fugitives, 
are not fugitives during the appellate process. Seet e.g., Oretega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 242-
246; Nath, 52 P.3d at 862-863. In Utah, however, the appellate courts have no discretionary 
power to hear or refuse to hear the appeals of former fugitives. This Court's decisions do not 
allow an appellate court to dismiss a former fugitive's appeal or to refuse to reinstate a 
former fugitive's appeal unless the State can show that it has been prejudiced by the 
defendant's absence. See State v. Verikokides, 925 P.2d 1255, 1256 (Utah 1996). 
8 
Utah, on the other hand, has a very liberal reinstatement rule. "[U]nless the State 
can show that it has been prejudiced by the defendant's absence and the consequent lapse 
of time," "a criminal appeal dismissed after escape may be reinstated." Tuttle, 713 P.2d at 
705. In jurisdictions where reinstatement is not available, sound policy militates in favor 
of a discretionary approach to dismissal. A mandatory dismissal rule might operate to 
punish defendants whose escapes have had little effect on the appellate process or who, 
despite brief absences, have clearly meritorious claims. In Utah, however, where this 
Court has held that "refusing to reinstate appeals of those who escape and are returned to 
custody raises serious due process and equal protection questions under the Utah 
Constitution," an automatic dismissal rule is an efficient means to address the appeals of 
fugitives, some of whom will never return to the jurisdiction. The automatic dismissal 
rule relieves the appellate courts and the State of the burden associated with processing an 
appeal that would involve "an uncertain, if not entirely futile, expenditure of judicial [and 
prosecution and defense] resources." 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 27.5(c) 
(2d ed. 1999). At the same time, because Utah dismissals are readily subject to 
reinstatement, an automatic dismissal rule does not result in the forfeiture of a defendant's 
right to appeal. 
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Reply to Defendant's Point II 
WHERE A DEFENDANT IS A FUGITIVE, AN APPELLATE 
COURT MAY NOT REACH THE MERITS OF HIS CLAIM THAT 
HIS SENTENCE WAS ILLEGALLY IMPOSED UNDER UTAH 
RULE OF PROCEDURE 22(e) 
Defendant argues that "an appellate court can consider whether a sentence was 
illegally imposed under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e) even if the issue was not 
raised below and the defendant is absent." Br. Respondent at 26. Defendant has merged 
two issues: first, whether an appellate court can reach the merits of a defendant's claim 
that his sentence was illegally imposed under Rule 22(e) if the issue is raised for the first 
time on appeal and, second, whether an appellate court can reach the merits of the claim 
where defendant is a fugitive. 
Under this Court's precedent, an appellate court can reach the merits of a 
defendant's claim that his sentence is an illegal sentence under rule 22(e), "even if the 
issue is raised for the first time on appeal." See State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 
1995). By extension, it seems reasonable that an appellate court can reach the merits of a 
defendant's claim that his sentence is an "illegally imposed" sentence under rule 22(e), 
even if that issue is raised for the first time on appeal. (The State, however, disputes 
defendant's characterization of the sentence here as "illegally imposed" for purposes of 
rule 22(e). See Br. Petitioner at 7 n.3.) 
However, rule 22(e) provides no exception to Utah's fugitive dismissal rule. Rule 
22(e) provides only an exception to the normal preservation requirement, an exception 
10 
consistent with the language indicating that the sentences can be corrected "at any time." 
Rule 22(e) does not address fugitive appeals and does not provide an avenue to appellate 
review where review is barred for reasons other than lack of preservation. It does not 
"trump" Utah's fugitive dismissal rule. 
Defendant further argues that the court of appeals correctly reasoned that 
considerations of judicial economy also support a holding that an appellate court can 
review an illegal sentence even when the claim is raised by a fugitive defendant. Br. 
Respondent at 27-28. Even assuming that resolution of the appeal might in some way 
further the interests of judicial economy, consideration of judicial economy is a merely 
discretionary matter. The interests of judicial economy do not displace or "trump" the 
established precedent of this Court regarding the dismissal of fugitive appeals.4 
The Court of Appeals' decision to review defendant's rule 22(e) claim, despite his 
fugitive status, was error.5 
4Further, dismissal of a fugitive defendant's appeal at the earliest possible 
juncture is the most economic use of judicial resources. As soon as a defendant's fugitive 
status is known, the appellate court, on its own sua sponte motion or upon request of either 
party, should dismiss. It makes little sense for either party to brief the issues or for the court 
to devote its resources to an appeal that will have no practical effect unless and until the 
defendant returns to the jurisdiction. 
5Even had the decision to dismiss or adjudicate been discretionary, the court of 
appeals' decision to reach the merits would have constituted an abuse of discretion. The 
Court of Appeals apparently believed that Statev. Wanosiky2Q0\ UTApp241,31 P.3d615, 
controlled the fugitive dismissal issue. It did not. Wanosik was not a fugitive at the time his 
appeal was decided, and the Wanosik court did not address the rights of fugitive defendants. 
Because the court of appeals erroneously concluded that it was bound by Wanosik, it 
abused its discretion. See Featherstone v. Schaerrer, 2001 UT 86, f 41, 34 P.3d 194 
11 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on _ ^ _ January 2003. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
( JEANNE B. INOUYE 
\Assk*ant Attorney General 
(holding that "court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard"). Further, 
this Court had already granted certiorari review in Wanosik when the court of appeals filed 
its decision in the instant case. Where defendant was fugitive and not incarcerated, the court 
of appeals might wisely have postponed its decision until this Court had determined whether 
the court of appeals' Wanosik decision was correct. 
Further, the court of appeals9 other cited basis for its decision—judicial 
economy—was unreasonable. Resolution of a fugitive defendant's rule 22(e) claim would 
not, in fact, economize the use of judicial resources. Resolution of a rule 22(e) claim while 
a defendant is a fugitive does not save any resources. If a defendant returns, his appeal may 
be reinstated. The appeal would come before the appellate court in the same posture it had 
when it was dismissed. No remand to the trial court would be necessary. The rule 22(e) 
claim would remain with the appellate court and the court would expend approximately the 
same quantity of judicial resources to resolve the issue after the fugitive defendant returns 
as it would have expended to resolve the issue while the defendant remained a fugitive. 
Resolution of a rule 22(e) claim while a defendant is a fugitive may, however, waste 
judicial resources. A fugitive defendant may, in fact, never return to the jurisdiction. Where 
a defendant does not return, his appeal would not be reinstated. If the appellate courts 
postpone the adjudication of claims raised by fugitive defendants, waiting until the 
defendants are again in the jurisdiction, they will expend judicial resources only where the 
expenditure will have some practical effect. They will not waste resources adjudicating the 
claims of defendants who will never return and for whom an adjudication may well be 
unenforceable. Considerations of judicial economy therefore support dismissing the claims 
of fugitive defendants, including their rule 22(e) claims. Because judicial economy favors 
postponement of a decision on a fugitive defendant's appeal, a decision to hear a fugitive 
defendant's appeal for reasons of judicial economy would be unreasonable and an abuse of 
discretion. See West Valley City v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 371, 373 n.l (Utah App. 1997) 
(holding that court abuses its discretion when its acts unreasonably). 
-"2T 
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